Ibadan had already become involved in yet another war over
trade with Egba and Ijebu in 1877, when Ibadan traders on their way from Porto
Novo with firearms were attacked by the Egba. This gave the Ekiti and the Ijesa
their chance. In 1878, the revolt against Ibadan rule started with the massacre
of Ibadan officials in Ijesa, Igbomina and Ekiti. This led to a war which
dragged on for sixteen years. Eventually, Ibadan found itself fighting on five
fronts. In the east it faced the Ekitiparapo under the command of Ogedemgbe,
the Seriki of Ijesa. In the south it faced the Egba and Ijebu. Ilorin joined in
in the north. Finally, Ife joined the alliance in 1882. There had long been
friction between the Ife and the Oyo settlers at Modakeke. These animosities
were strengthened by the war during which Ife itself was sacked by the Modakeke
and their Ibadan allies, and Modakeke was sacked by the Ife and Ekiti.
The main action of the war, however, took place in the
north-east. The Ibadan and Ekitiparapo forces faced each other at Kiriji, a few
miles east of Ikirun. Control of the trade routes was a major issue. There were
three main routes to the interior, via Egba, Ijebu and Ondo. The Ondo route had
been opened up by the British because of the frequent closure of the other
roads. During this war, it became the main supply route for both sides
(Akintoye, 1969). Some Ibadan supplies were able to get through via Ijebu. The
war was unpopular with Ijebu traders, and the Awujale was forced into exile in
1885. Despite this, the flow of supplies was not completely free. Ijebu
traders' profit margins were high, and they retained strict control of trade
through the kingdom (Johnson, 1921: 610-11).
After some initial reverses, the Ekitiparapo gained
something of an advantage in the conflict, and the help they received from
Ekiti Saro merchants in Lagos was crucial. The most important factor was the
supply of breech-loading rifles, much more accurate than the arms being used by
the rest of the Yoruba, though the Ibadan were later able to get a small supply
of them as well (Akintoye, 1971: 119).
Attempts at mediation had started as early as 1879-80. Both
the Alafin and the Oni were involved, but neither was trusted by both sides,
and Ife later joined in the fighting. The Lagos government was under
instructions from London and Accra to keep out of the conflict, even though the
fighting was having serious effects on the economic life of the colony. Under
commercial and mission pressure, the Lagos government attempted to mediate but
was rebuffed, and from 1882 to 1884 the British did nothing. Attempts by Saro
in Lagos and by the Fulani emirs to end the conflict also failed.
After 1885 the attitude of the administration started to
change. Firstly, there was the changing political status of Lagos which was
separated from the Gold Coast in 1886. Secondly, the scramble for Africa by the
colonial powers was well under way, and there were fears of French
interference. Thirdly, some of the main protagonists of the war were themselves
getting tired of it (Akintoye, 1971: 176).
To negotiate a peace, the administration turned to the CMS.
A ceasefire was arranged in 1886 through the efforts of Samuel Johnson, the
historian, and Charles Phillips, later the Bishop of Ondo. The parties then
signed a treaty in Lagos with Governor Maloney which provided for the
independence of the Ekitiparapo towns and the evacuation of Modakeke, to suit
Ife,. This proved impossible to carry out. Ilorin refused to stop fighting in
the north where it was besieging Ofa. Thus the war dragged on, and the forces
refused to disband (Akintoye, 1971: 181-4).
British fears of the French soon appeared justified. There
was the curious incident of 1888 when an employee of a French company persuaded
the Egba chiefs to sign a treaty with France, providing for the construction of
a rail link with Porto Novo (Ayandele, 1966: 49-51). This was a direct threat
to trade with Lagos, but the French refused to ratify the treaty. The two
powers hastily agreed on a frontier in 1889 (Anene, 1963). The areas recently
invaded by Dahomey fell within the French sphere of influence. The British
moved into the interior with the establishment of a post at Ilaro in 1890,
while the French invaded Dahomey in 1892.
More aggressive measures to extend British control in the
interior came with the arrival of Governor Carter in 1891. Like Glover, he took
the view that the key to the situation lay in control of the trade routes
through Ijebu and Egba. The result was the Ijebu expedition of 1892 (Ayandele,
1966: 54-69; Smith, 1971b). Ayandele suggests that in fact the Ijebu had showed
more willingness to open the road than the Egba, but the decision to attack
Ijebu was based partly on the hostility of the missions: unlike Egba, Ijebu had
never allowed them in. The impact of the expedition was considerable. In 1893,
Carter was able to set off on a tour around Yorubaland, making treaties with
Oyo and Egba, and finally persuading the Ibadan and Ekitiparapo forces to
disperse. The Egba opened the road to Ibadan, and allowed the start of railway
construction. After two final incidents, the bombardment of Oyo in 1895
(Ayandele, 1967) and the capture of Ilorin by the Royal Niger Company in 1897,
effective colonial control was established throughout most of Yorubaland.
Compiled by Babajide Adebayo
Culled from the internet
